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economic growth (GDP). The final results show that there is a significant positive 
relationship between IPR and GDP.  
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Background 
 
 “Intellectual property (IP)” refers to inventions, devices, new varieties of designs and 
other properties that are produced through “mental or creative labour” by human 
beings, and the law regulating intellectual property is “highly politicized.” 1 
Considering the innovation is one of the most important dynamic for the economic 
growth, and the affects of intellectual property rights on innovation, the IPR plays a 
very important role on economic growth, especially in the long-run. In 1999, the 
Report from World Bank highlighted the role of knowledge and the contributions of 
intellectual property rights in social and economic progress
2
.  
 
The authorities in China try to gain more dynamics on economic growth through 
improving the intellectual property rights system. But previous studies find the effect 
of the IPR on economic growth is not very clear. The effect depend on several 
variables, like economic policy, income level, human capital, innovation ability etc. 
Maybe the strong IPR protection could not encourage the economic growth as most of 
us expected, especially when we consider the social cost for taking the strong IPR 
protection in China. In this study, I would like to overview the effect of IPR protection 
on the economics, and study the relationship between IPR and economic growth in 
China with the data of IPR protection and economic growth. With this study, I try to 
find out whether increasing IPR protection can make some positive contribution on 
economic growth in China.  
 
                                                          
1. Bently, L. and Sherman, B. (2001), Intellectual Property Law (1st ed.), New York: Oxford 
University Press, at 1-2. 
2. World Bank (1999), World Development Report – Knowledge for Development, New York: 
Oxford University Press. 
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Intellectual property protection is a policy package that includes patent length and 
breadth, protection of trademarks, copyrights and trade secrets, and the degree of 
enforcement
3
. Considering the different effects of these aspects, in this study I will 
focus on patent protection, which has the most important and directly effects on 
innovation and economic growth compare with others.  
 
1.2 Review the previous study 
 
The IPR system literature by former scholars such as Grossman and Helpman, Maskus, 
and Ginarte etc will be used to develop this study. Literatures on the effect of IPR on 
economic growth in the developing economics have been particularly useful when 
study the relationship in China. 
The theoretical model developed by Grossman and Helpman (1991) is about the 
innovation and economic growth
4
. Based on this study, Helpman (1993) analyzed the 
different IPR protection‟s effect in two regimes5. In his research, Helpman developed 
the dynamic general equilibrium models of two regions, North and South. He assumed 
the North invents new products and the South imitates technologies that have been 
invented in the North. With the strengthen IPR protection, the productions in the South 
have to be closed. In the short term, for more productions will be made in the North, 
the North gain more benefit. However, in the long-run, since more resources were 
shitted out of research sectors to production process, the innovation activities would be 
damaged. In Helpman‟s study, the South cannot gain any benefit with the strength IPR 
protection. However, in the real life, even the developing countries still have some 
innovation activities. Not all of the production in the developing countries imitates 
                                                          
3 . Kwan, Y. K. and Lai, E.L.-C (2003), Intellectual Property Rights Protection and 
Endogenous Economic Growth, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Vol 27, 853-873.  
4. Grossman, G. M. and Helpman, E. (1991), Innovation and Growth in the Global Economy, 
Cambridge, MA, MIT Press. 
5. Helpman, E. (1993), Innovation, imitation and intellectual property rights, Econometrica 61 
(6), 1247–1280.  
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others. For instance, China is a developing country, and imitations are very common 
there. But we can still find some domestic innovations. The patent information in 
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) can reflect the innovation ability in 
China. The number of PCT applications for 2007 indicated that Chinese companies 
filed 5,456 patents.  
David M. Gould and William C. Gruben (1996) found the role of stronger intellectual 
property rights on economic growth is not very clear
6
. The effect is influenced by the 
level of development. In the open trade regimes, the expected competition forces to 
improve the innovation process and intellectual property system, to protect their 
innovation ability. But for the close trade regimes, the strong IPR protection has no 
ability to encourage the economic growth. The manufactories in these regimes prefer to 
develop their business with the low cost imitation instead of paying a lot on the 
innovation activities.  
Park Walter G and Ginarte Juan Carlos (1997) studied the relationship for a cross-
section of countries and found that the strong IPRs could not contribute on the 
economic growth directly
7
. Instead, the IPRs encourage the investment activities, for 
instance, the research and development activities. In the long-run, the strong IPR 
system would benefit the economic growth with more innovation.  
Croix and Konan (2002) analyze the effect of the IPRs in China on the international 
trade between USA and China
8
. This research found that many developing countries 
prefer to set different IPR in different situation. The strong IPR protection is too early 
for some developing countries.  
                                                          
6. Gould, D. M., and Gruben, W. C. (1996), The Role of Intellectual Property Rights in 
Economic Growth, Journal of Development Economics, Vol. 48, 323-350. 
7. Park, W. G. and Ginarte, J. C. (1997), Intellectual Property Rights and Economic Growth, 
Journal of Research Policy, Vol. 26, 283-301.  
8. Croix, S. J. L. and Konan, D. E. (2002), Intellectual Property Rights in China: The Changing 
Political Economy of Chinese-American Interests, The World Economy, 25(6): 759-788.   
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In this study, I would like to analysis the relationship between the IPR protection and 
economic growth in China. Try to find out whether strengthen IPR protection could 
incite the Chinese economic growth. These previous researches provide a good guide 
for the study in this field. 
 
1.3 Aims and Research Questions  
 
The principal aim of this study is to assess the effect of IPR protection on the economic 
growth in China. 
Address the following question: 
 For the industrial countries, the cost of strengthen IPR is less than countries 
who have weak innovation ability. As a developing country, the ability of 
innovation in China is not very strong with the limited both physical capital and 
knowledge accumulation. With the high cost of enforcing, whether the 
increasing IPR protection can make some contribution on the economic 
development is not very clear. Considering this, the first question is in China, a 
developing country with weak innovation ability, what the role of intellectual 
property protection is? 
 The second question is what the effect of applying the strength intellectual 
property protection as the innovation strategy on China‟s economy growth is? 
 
1.4 Method and Material 
 
In order to assess the role of IPR on the economic growth in China, the correlation 
study will be developed based on the time-series analysis. The study use both primary 
and secondary data to conduct the empirical analysis.  
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The IPR system literature by former scholars such as Grossman and Helpman, Maskus, 
and Ginarte etc will be used to develop the study. Literature on the effect of IPR on 
economic growth in the developing economics have been particularly useful when 
study the relationship in China.  
 
The data used in this study content both primary and secondary data. The authority 
records of the economic data in China‟s Statistical Yearbook published by the China‟s 
Statistical Bureau are very useful. The data about the IPR protection is calculated with 
the method developed by Park Walter G and Ginarte Juan Carlos. The Ginarte-Park 
index of IPR protection makes the analysis here possible.  However, Ginarte-Park 
Index focuses more on the legislation in one country. In China, the enforcement is not 
as good as the law written on the paper. The stronger enforcement of the law in China 
after 2000 cannot be reflected by Ginarte-Park Index either, because the law on paper 
did not change any more.  In the future study, the result could be more reliable, if a 
better index about the IPR protection could be developed. 
 
2. The Economic Growth Theory 
 
The study on the economic growth last for hundred years. Through these studies, 
economists try to find out the influence factors behind the economic growth. In the 
beginning of 20th century, the development of the Harrod-Domar model showed the 
economic growth was explained by the capital accumulation. The Neo-classical model 
adds the labor and technological change as other factors influence the economic 
growth comparing with the Harrod-Domar model. But the technology was treated as an 
exogenous factor. In 1980s, the development of the endogenous growth theory explains 
the technology development could increase the rate of return and the marginal 
productivity etc. With the emergence of the new growth theories, innovation has been 
treated as one of the dynamics for the long-run economic growth.  
 
In the study of new growth theorists, such as Romer (1990), Grossman and Helpman 
(1991) recognize innovation as an engine to sustained growth. The process of 
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knowledge accumulation generates endogenously the productivity gain that sustains 
growth in the long run
9
. The new growth theories have shifted attention from capital to 
knowledge and learning within the field of economics and the study of economic 
growth.  
 
In the old days, since the gap in technology was not very big, the organization could 
easily get more output and higher growth with more physical capital, compare with 
others. Nowadays, however, the physical capital is no longer the key element in the 
economic development. The former Soviet Union is one of the good examples to 
support this point. With a good job of accumulating the physical and human capital, 
the economic did not grow very well in that country.  
 
Beside the physical and human capital accumulation, the technology is also one of the 
necessary driving forces especially for the long-run economic growth. We can easily 
find a lot of evidences support this saying even during the industry revolution period. 
The innovation happened in Great Britain in that period accelerated the economic 
development, made the economic growth there faster than any other parts of the world. 
With the advanced technology, the production process could be improved more. It 
means even with the same capital and labor input, the advanced technology could 
produce more output. This effect makes innovation holder has more competitive. All 
the organizations are trying to gain the sustainable development in the long term 
through the innovation. Douglass C. North (1981) notices that „throughout man‟s past 
he has continually developed new techniques, but the pace has been slow and 
intermittent. The primary reason has been that the incentives for developing new 
techniques have occurred only sporadically.‟10  
                                                          
9 . Grossman, G. M. and Helpman, E. (1991), Innovation and Growth in the Global Economy, 
Cambridge, MA, MIT Press. 
10 . North, Douglass C. (1981), Structure and Change in Economic History, New York: W.W. 
Norton & Company, Inc., p. 164. 
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The failure to develop systematic property rights in innovation up until fairly modern 
times was a major source of the slow pace of technological change
11
. Offering the prize 
and protect the monopoly right to innovators are the most two common methods to 
encourage the innovation. Building the Intellectual Property Right system aim to 
encourage the innovation through offering right to use intellectual property to gain 
profit. North found that „a systematic set of incentives to encourage technological 
change and raise the private rate of return on innovation closer to the social rate of 
return was established only with the patent system.‟12 Using Intellectual Property Right 
as a kind of right, make the knowledge to be one kind of property to gain the return of 
formerly innovation process and create profit in the following days.13  
3. The role of intellectual property rights  
 
Within every regime, building the IPR protection systems through laws mainly 
consider two reasons. One is to promote investments in knowledge creation and 
innovation by establishing exclusive rights to use and sell newly developed 
technologies, goods, and services.
14
  For the knowledge is a kind of non-rival goods, it 
is easy to be gotten by the public. Without the laws protection, the imitators can easily 
reproduce the advanced technology without paying any cost on the research work. The 
imitators could easily offer a more competitive price and gain more profit than 
innovators with low cost. Hence, there would be less willing to invest on the research 
and innovation process in the under-protection situation. All producers would like to 
                                                          
11 . Ibid  
12 . North, Douglass C. (1981), Structure and Change in Economic History, New York: W.W. 
Norton & Company, Inc., p. 164-165. 
13. Granstrand O. (2005), Innovation and Intellectual Property Right, Fagerberg, J., Mowery, 
D.C. and Nelson, R.R. (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Innovation (266-290), New York: 
Oxford University Press. 
14 . Maskus, K. E. (2000), Intellectual Property Rights and Economic Development, Prepared 
for the series “Beyond the Treaties: A Symposium on Compliance with International 
Intellectual Property Law”.  
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share the free advanced knowledge developed by others rather than investing a lot of 
money, human capital and time on the high risk and expensive research work. With the 
protection from IPR system, the innovators and creators could gain additional profit 
thought the monopoly right of using and selling their knowledge. Under the good 
protection, there will be more willing to spend physical capital and human resources on 
innovation activities with the expectation of gaining more monopoly profit.  
 
The other is to promote widespread dissemination of new knowledge.
15
 Considering 
the non-rival character, knowledge is a kind of public-good, easy to be used and 
adopted by others. The innovators would like to gain the monopoly profit by keeping 
the knowledge privately rather than public to others. For instance, Coca-cola gains the 
monopoly profit through keeping the ingredient secret. The IPR laws provide 
innovators the legal right to gain monopoly price with their knowledge. But, at the 
same time, in order to gain the legal right, innovators have to publish all the 
information about the technology to others following the rules of IPR laws. Publishing 
the technology information will accelerate the technology developed process through 
disseminating the new knowledge. Based on the previous results, the next generation 
could be developed more efficient. Without repeating the research, a lot of energy, 
time and capital will be saved.  
 
One of the most important function of IPR is efficient the knowledge transition. Based 
on the rules of IPR laws, the patent application must enclose all the technology 
information and public the information. The publication lower the access cost to latest 
knowledge and make the information transition more efficient. Great IPR system also 
speed the dissemination of knowledge with international cooperation, such as Foreign 
Direct Investment (FDI), international trade, technology license etc. Region with good 
IPR system has more attraction to international cooperation. Without worrying the free 
imitation, innovators would like to place their manufactures and product with advanced 
                                                          
15 . Maskus, K. E. (2000), Intellectual Property Rights and Economic Development, Prepared 
for the series “Beyond the Treaties: A Symposium on Compliance with International 
Intellectual Property Law”. 
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technology in this market. With the inventions and ideas on the market, the region 
could get more advanced technology information and develop their own technology 
based on the existing knowledge. Good IPRs can benefit all social and protect the 
individual monopoly profit at the same time.    
 
3.1 Development of IPR protection in China 
 
China's intellectual property system has developed a lot during the past years. In the 
Maoist era, there was not any private property. A person who has private property was 
thought as selfish, exploiting. Everyone was shamed on this. All the properties belong 
to the masses in that period. In August 1950, Chinese central government promulgated 
a regulation on protection innovation and patent right. The inventor could get the 
patent right and rewards followed this regulation. This regulation was instead by a new 
regulation which was promulgated in 1963 by the central government. In the new 
regulation the innovator can only get the rewards for their contribution on the 
technology improvement, cannot gain the monopoly right to use the technology. China 
did not enact the patent law to protect the intellectual property until 1985. The patent 
law was amended twice in 1992 and 2000, respectively. But the enforcement in China 
was not paid much attention until 2001, when China got the admission to the World 
Trade Organization (WTO). In order to fulfill the requirements for becoming the 
member of WTO, Chinese government made a lot of efforts to improve IPR system to 
meet the strong minimum standards of IPR laws in TRIPS agreement. Today, the 
sophisticated laws and constant government encouragement has pushed China into the 
top three of PCT patent filing countries. The data from WIPO on the number of PCT 
applications for 2007 indicated that Chinese companies filed 5,456 patents, a 38% 
increase comparing with the figure in 2006.  
 
3.2 The impact on investment in the technology innovation 
activities  
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In Sherwood (1990) study, a survey in Brazilian indicated that 80 percent of 377 firms 
would invest more in internal research and would improve training for their employees 
if better legal protection on IPR were available.
16
  
 
In the weak protection system, the individual has limited interesting on investing 
innovative activities. In the case of under-protection, the advanced technology can be 
easily imitated by others without paying for using advanced technology and spending 
resources on R&D activities. Facing the competition from the imitators, the innovators 
are in a disadvantage position with high cost on previous research work. The imitators 
can offer a lower price and get more profit than the innovators with the low cost 
imitation. The cost for the innovation activities will be difficult to cover, facing these 
competitions. With under-protection, all producers want to enjoy the imitation profit 
instead of investing on the high cost and risk innovation activities.  
 
With the protection from the IPR system, the innovators can gain monopoly profit with 
the right of applying and selling their advanced technology. We assume the resources 
is limited, the producers have to make a decision on how to distribute their limited 
resources. If they invest more resources in the production process, the research and 
development (R&D) activities input have to be reduced. On the opposite side, more 
R&D investment will shrink the investment on production. The decision of the 
producer depends on which activity can bring more profit. With good IPR protection, 
the new knowledge is protected as patent, copyright etc. The imitations become harder 
and high risk under the good IPR regime. At the same time, the innovation could bring 
more expected profit with the monopoly price during the protection period with the 
right to use and sell the innovation. Hence, with the expectation of more profit, the 
investment on innovation activities will be increased. At the whole social level, 
innovation rate will increase with more investment on innovation activities.   
 
                                                          
16. Sherwood, R. M. (1990), Intellectual Property and Economic Development, (Westview 
Press, Boulder, CO).  
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In Helpsman‟s study (1993), he analyzed the effect of strengthen IPR on the innovation 
within the endogenous growth theory context in North-South model
17
. In this model, 
there are only two regions, the North and the South. The North makes the innovation, 
and the South only imitates the technology developed in the North. With strength IPR 
protection, there is an inverted-U relationship between time and innovation rate in this 
model. The rate of innovation rises initially but declines subsequently.
18
 At beginning, 
the tight IPRs lessen the imitation in the South. At this time, with the expectation of 
gaining more profit with the monopoly price, the North will put more resources in the 
research work to accelerate the innovation process. However, for the less imitation in 
the South, North have to spend more resources on the new product activities to satisfy 
the market demand and gain profit with the manufacture and selling in the following 
days. More resources have to be shifted from R&D sector to producing sectors. With 
less investment in R&D sector, the innovation rate will be diminished. In this model, 
Helpsman assumes it is a closed-economy, ignores the transition of the production 
activities between each other. Furthermore, the South was treated as without any 
innovation ability, cannot make any contribution on increasing innovation rate. Less 
and less investment will spend on the innovation activities in North with the strong IPR 
protection in the close economy, the rate of innovation will decrease with the less 
investment in the long-run.  
 
However, if the international cooperation were considered in the model, like FDI, 
licensing of technology etc, as the later studies found, the investment on research and 
development work will not drop down any more, and rate of innovation will be higher 
with the tight IPRs protection. Lai (1998) finds that the rate of innovation increases 
with stronger IPR protection in both the North and the South as long as FDI is the 
major channel of international technology diffusion.19
 
When the production activities 
                                                          
17. Helpman, E. (1993). Innovation, Imitation and Intellectual Property Rights, Econometrica 
61 (6), 1247–1280. 
18 . Ibid 
19. Lai, E.L.-C. (1998), International Intellectual Property Rights Protection and the Rate of 
Product Innovation, Journal of Development Economics, 55.115-130. 
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can take in other regions, there is no need to shift the resources out of R&D sector. On 
the global level, the rate of innovation will keep rising. In the study of Yun and Lai 
(2003), they found „tightening IPR protection will induce an immediate loss of current 
consumption arising from the expansion of the R&D sector, but a gain in future 
consumption as a result of more investment in R&D, which induces faster innovation 
and faster growth‟ 20, as shown in Graph 3-1.  
 
Based on the globalization environment, the strength IPR protection will induce more 
investment on R&D activities, and gain more innovation and higher economic growth 
rate in the long-run. When the tight IPR protection is applied, the investment in R&D 
would increase immediately, with the consideration of higher interest rate and more 
saving in the future. The production falls down at the same time caused by the higher 
investment in R&D. On the other hand, the tight investment in R&D will lead to higher 
growth rate of production in future with the output of R&D on innovation.  
 
Graph 3-1, The time path of consumption (C(t)) 
          T 
 Note: The tight IPR protection is announced at t0 
 
                                                          
20 . Kwan, Y. K. and Lai, E.L.-C (2003), Intellectual Property Rights Protection and 
Endogenous Economic Growth, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Vol 27, 853-873. 
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3.3 Investment on technology innovation activities in China 
 
Realizing the important of the innovation on economic growth, China‟s government 
encourages innovation activities with many methods, for instance, investing more on 
education, offering special fund for high-tech research work. Taking stronger IPR 
institutions is one of these methods. With the strengthen IPR protection, China‟s R&D 
input as a percentage of GDP keeps increasing, which has been shown in Graph 3-2, 
from 0.5 per cent in 1994 grow to 1.48 per cent in 2007
21
.  
 
Graph 3-2, China‟s R&D input as a percentage of GDP, 1990-2004 
 
Source: China‟s Statistical Yearbook, Various years, National Bureau of  
Statistics, China Statistics Press 
 
If we treat domestic patent application as the indicator of innovation output, we can 
easily found that the innovation in China, keep high growth rate, especially after 2000 
when China became one of the members of WTO. China improved the IPR system a 
lot to fulfill TRIPS‟s requirement on IPR protection. Graph 3-3 has shown us the 
                                                          
21 . The figure came from China‟s Statistical Yearbook, National Bureau of Statistics, China 
Statistics Press. 
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domestic patent application trend. After 2000, the growth rate has a rapid increase. 
Tight IPRs encourages more investment on innovation activities and brings more 
innovation in China. 
 
Graph 3-3, Domestic Patents Application in China, 1985-2008 
 
Source: Annual Report, Various years, state intellectual property office of the people‟s 
republic of China 
 
3.4 The impact on the technology transition 
 
In addition to prompt the investment on innovation, the IPR system also tries to speed 
the information transition at the whole society level. The second purpose of Intellectual 
property rights system is stimulating acquisition and dissemination of information.  
 
The regulation of IPR laws requires applicators public all technology information for 
getting patent right. These rules create more chances for public to gain the knowledge. 
Others beside innovators can gain the knowledge about the technology easily and use 
the information legally to develop further inventions by paying fee. Because the 
property right on knowledge can be protected by the IPRs, innovators can accept the 
requirement for public technology information. The publication cannot damage their 
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monopoly profit. It is difficult to image that innovators have any willing to public their 
technology information if others are free to reproduce them within weak protection 
situation. The good IPRs lower the access cost to knowledge for public, hence speed 
the acquisition and dissemination of information.   
 
In addition to this, better IPR situation also induces knowledge spillover at the 
international level by attracting foreign firms to locate plants or selling products in this 
region. Studying the advanced technology developed in other countries is the important 
way to accumulate knowledge and improve the innovation ability for developing 
countries. Weak IPR protection will less the willing to invest or cooperate from others. 
It is difficult for technology holders to collect enough return with the competition from 
the imitation with lower cost. And the cost for maintain intellectual property in the 
weak protection system is much high, since technology holders have to pay more 
attention on protection their intellectual property. The free imitation retards the 
international cooperation and damage the information transition process. Under the 
good IPR system, it will be easier to translate the advanced information from abroad 
with international cooperation.  
 
Knowledge formation is cumulative and as new inventions build on past practices the 
process of technical change could accelerate.
22
 The efficient technology transition 
could accelerate the technology improvement process. As we all know a lot of 
innovations are made by recombination of existing technology. A lot of innovations are 
the improvement of the existing technology. The technologies which have been already 
used, give the innovators more ideas to invent advanced technology based on them.  
Easy access to the existing technology also prevents potential inventors from 
misspending their resource by reinvent. Technology dissemination reduces the cost for 
accessing the existing knowledge, especially for the knowledge developed outside the 
country. With the easy access to knowledge, the advanced technology can be learned 
                                                          
22. Scotchmer, S. (1991), Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: Cumulative Research and the 
Patent Law, Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 5, 29-42. 
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and practiced more, and result in the economic growth with the further advanced 
technology. This process for improving productivity by learning technology through 
patent information, takes place much shorter than through innovation activities. 
Without the patent system, time for learning existing technology will be much longer, 
since the information is difficult to access. We have to spend more time and energy on 
research work. The industry revolution in England is one of these examples. As the 
study by Joel Mokyr (2005) shown, the great improvement of productivity with the 
advanced technology in England during industry revolution period coursed by the easy 
access to knowledge.
23
 Douglass C. North also found the Industrial Revolution was 
acceleration in the rate of innovation due to better specified property rights.
24
 
 
From the WIPO‟s report, capital can be saved by 60% and time can be saved by 40%, 
if the research work based on the existed patent information. Good IPR protection 
afford firms greater certainty that they face limited threats of uncompensated 
appropriation.  This certainty could induce them to trade and license their technologies 
and products more readily, enhancing their diffusion into the economy. 
 
The technology transition at the international level is more efficient for accelerating the 
innovation process in developing countries. In the North-South model, South has 
limited innovation ability at beginning. The innovation activities will be very hard and 
high cost for South with limited intellectual accumulation. But, they can make 
improvement quickly with the existing technologies developed by North. During the 
middle of 20
th
 century, a large part of the technology development in Japan was based 
on the technology transmitted from other industrial countries.  
 
Nowadays, China has developed a lot with more knowledge accumulation in past years. 
But the innovation ability compare with developed countries is still very weak. Graph 
                                                          
23. Joel, M. (2005), The Intellectual Origins of Modern Economic Growth, The Journal of 
Economic History, 65, 285-351 
24. North, Douglass C. (1981), Structure and Change in Economic History, New York: W.W. 
Norton & Company, Inc., p. 159. 
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3-4 shows that most of the domestic patent applications in China are Utility Model, 
based on the small improvement of previous invention. For the most knowledge 
intensive patent, invention is the least in the three kind of patent application. Learning 
from others with more advanced technology is valued for improving the innovation 
ability in China. Increasing IPRs can absorb more technology knowledge from abroad. 
There are three main ways to transit the technology knowledge at the international 
level, FDI, international trade and licenses.  
 
Graph 3-4, patent application in three different kinds in China, 1985-2005 
 
Source: Annual Report, Various years, state intellectual property office of the people‟s 
republic of China 
 
3.4.1 IPR and FDI  
 
With FDI, the host-country can employ capital, equipment, and technology, which 
enhances the productivity of its own resources, from abroad. The knowledge spillover 
from FDI help the host-country enjoy the knowledge accumulated in other countries, 
both the advanced technology and management skills. Regarding protecting the 
technology, managing against infringement in under-protection situation will cost the 
technology holder a lot, not only lost physical capital but also knowledge property. 
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They have to spend more on protecting their technology and stopping others‟ 
infringement activities. Worrying about the free rider of the technology and the high 
cost of management, the under-protection situation will be less attracting for 
investment with advanced technology compare with the stronger IPR protection 
situation. Countries moving up the FDI cycle find a growing economic interest on 
adopting stronger IPRs, an interest congruent with their own expanding abilities to 
produce new products and technologies.
25
 
 
The IPR also has different effects on different industries. Certain industries are more 
sensitive to the IPRs than others. For instance, the chemical and pharmaceutical 
industry is dependent on IP protection, since the technology in this field is easy to copy. 
U.S. firms, limit foreign direct investment in the countries with weak intellectual 
property rights protection, particularly in the chemical and pharmaceutical industries
26
.   
 
In addition to the volume of FDI, the quality of FDI is another important factor 
affected by the IPRs. For the R&D facilities and the final productions are significantly 
depends on the IPR protection
27
. With the weak IPR protection, FDI always happened 
with the low-tech product which has limited knowledge or high-tech which is difficult 
to be learned. It is difficult to learn more valued knowledge within this kind FDI.  
 
Under-protection IPR even hinders the transition of knowledge. The stronger IPR 
protection make sure the technology will be protected by the law, hence the technology 
holders do not need to worry their technology be copied by rivals with free. 
Technology can be transmitted more with FDI under the protection of IPRs. The FDI, 
let engineers, managers or suppliers and consumers learn the advanced technology 
                                                          
25  . Maskus, K. E. (2000), Intellectual Property Rights and Foreign Direct Investment, 
(Working Paper No. 22), World Bank, Centre for International Economic Studies.  
26 . Mansfield, E. (1994), „Intellectual property protection, foreign direct investment, and 
technology transfer‟ (IFC discussion paper 19), The World Bank and International Finance 
Corporation, Washington, DC.   
27. Ibid.  
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through working or using process. Spillover knowledge will contribute on the further 
domestic innovation activities.  
 
However, the FDIs are influenced by a lot of factors, not only the IPRs, like the size of 
the country, the economic policy, labor cost etc. Some previous studies have found that 
the effects from IPRs on FDI are not very clear, especially in less developed countries. 
These developed countries with low skilled, education and productivity levels, fail to 
attract any FDI. In these countries, the level of IPR protection makes little or no 
difference on attracting FDI, since the FDI will not be developed there. Beside the 
capacity of one industry to be copied, the ability to imitate of one country also 
influenced the relation between an increase in FDI and stronger IPRs. 
 
For China, the big size market with low-cost labours and open economy policy has 
much attraction to FDI. Since 1990, China attracted 230 billion US dollars in foreign 
investment, which accounts for 45% of foreign direct investment entering Asia.
28
 Of 
course, the exchange rate, low-cost labor, and an increasing domestic market in China 
are parts the factors entice the international cooperation into China. However, when we 
consider the development of China‟s economic today, the competition on exchange 
rate and labor cost is lower than before. We need to find a sustainable way to attract 
FDI and get more knowledge transition to develop economic. In the early years, under 
the weak IPR protection, the private and imitation in China forced investors with 
advanced technology to hind their technology to avoid the free riders. The knowledge 
spillover in this case is limited. In the long-run, it is difficult to rely on these kinds of 
FDI, and international cooperation to get technology accumulation for improving 
innovation ability. China tries to attract more high quality FDI through better IPR 
protection situation.  
                                                          
28. Sie, A. K. Y., and Fryxell, G. E. (2004), Anti-counterfeiting strategies and managerial 
confidence in the IPR regime: An empirical examination of foreign brands in Chinese markets. 
Paper presented at the meeting of the Academy of Management, New Orleans, LA. 
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With amending patent law in 1992, IPR protection in China improved a lot. The 
growth rate of FDI accompanied to strength IPR protection also experienced a rapid 
growth, as Graph 3-5 shown. In 2000, China had received 40.7 million US Dollar in 
FDI. As one of the members in WTO, China promised complying with at least the 
minimum standards of IPR protection. This promise makes China attrect more FDI in 
the following years after 2000.  
 
Graph 3-5, Volume of FDI in China, 1985-2008 
 
Source: China‟s Statistical Yearbook, Various years, National Bureau of Statistics, 
China Statistics Press 
 
3.4.2 IPR and International Trade 
 
International trade provides channels of communication that stimulate cross-border 
learning of production methods, product design, organizational methods and market 
conditions. Each of these helps either to employ domestic resources more efficiently or 
enable a country to adjust foreign technologies to domestic use. Helpman, and 
Hoffmaister (1997) found that a one-percent increase in imports of machinery and 
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equipment from OECD countries tended to raise total factor productivity in developing 
countries by around 0.3 percentage points on average.
29
  
 
The intellectual property system is one of the key considerations when the firm has 
willing to develop the international market in other regions. The estimated value of 
intellectual property can rang to billions of dollars, so IPR protection is always been 
considered seriously.  Fink and Braga (1999) find that a foreign firm may give up the 
sale of their produces in a market where IPR protection is weak, since it will be 
difficult for them to reap benefits with the competition from free pirate
30
. The weak 
IPR could incentive foreign firms make the decision not to export the products with 
advanced technology to this market. In 1990s, international seed producers had to 
restrict the export of some seed varieties to Chinese farmers due to poorly specified 
IPRs for new plant varieties in China. The weak IPRs harder the information transition 
for China through the international trade. 
 
The effects of IPR protection on the international trade are also influenced by the 
countries‟ imitate ability. Smith (1999) analyzes the relationship between IPRs, and 
exports from the USA, in 96 countries
 31
. For those countries which have high ability to 
imitate, as she found, there is a positive relationship between trade and IPRs. IPR in 
the countries with weak imitation ability has no different or limited effects on the 
international trade. Smith concludes that IPR protections in importing countries are 
influenced the decision for US export, but only in countries that pose a threat of 
imitation.  
 
                                                          
29. Coe, D. T, Helpman, E. and Hoffmaister, A. W. (1997), North-south R&D Spillovers, The 
Economic Journal, 107 (440), 134-149.   
30. Fink, C. and Braga, C. A. P. (1999), How Stronger Protection of Intellectual Property 
Rights Affects International Trade Flows, from  
 http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.27.3802.  
31. Smith, P. J. (1999), Are Weak Patents a Barrier to U.S. Exports?, Journal of International 
Economics, vol. 48, 151-177. 
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One of the main driving forces for building the strong IPR system in China is the 
international trade.  In order to trade goods with United States, China signed the 1979 
Agreement on Trade Relations between United State and China. Following this 
agreement, China must adopt international IPR standards to protect intellectual 
property. After 2000, as one of the members in WTO, the special position brings a lot 
of benefits to the international trade between China and other members. At the same 
time, of course China as the member in WTO enforces the protection law regarding the 
IPR under the TRIPS agreement.  
 
Graph 3-6, international trade in China, 1985-2008, (0.1 Billion US Dollar) 
 
Source: China‟s Statistical Yearbook, Various years, National Bureau of Statistics, 
China Statistics Press.  
 
 
After joining WTO, the international trade in China boosts a lot, from 509.77 billion 
US dollar in 2001, persistently grow to 2561.6 billion US dollar in 2008. Growth rate 
has been shown on Graph 3-6. The percentage of international trade on GDP in these 
years also had a same trend. In 2001, the share was only 38.47%. In 2008, the share 
has increased to 63.86%.
32
 
                                                          
32 . The figure calculated with the information published by NSC. Detail information was 
given in the Appendix 2.  
 26 
 
 
A developing country's total factor productivity will be larger, when larger foreign 
R&D capital stock, more open to machinery and equipment imports from the industrial 
countries
33
. With better IPR situation, the big Chinese market will attract larger flow of 
international trade. At the same time, advanced technology accompanies the products 
will import to China. The export also has the ability to translate knowledge and 
information. When the goods are sold and used abroad, feedback and requirements 
come from the market will give producers more ideas about how to improve the 
product and technology. Based on transiting products with advanced knowledge with 
international trade, the innovation in China will be more efficient.  
 
3.4.3 IPR and License 
 
Concluding with the licensor, a written license contract gives the licensee a right for 
the exploitation of the patent with paying licensor fee. The license is the most directly 
way to transit the technology between the parties of the contract. The technology can 
be learned and used with the permission of license.  
 
Since, the buyers will  know all the information about what the buying technology is 
with the license, the seller have to make sure the buyer will not take off information 
and imitate the technology without paying for it. The weak IPR protection will raise 
the risk losing the technology with the license activities for sellers. Hence, the holder 
of the technology might be more willing to give up the cooperation under the weak 
IPRs, or just transfer the old technology, or without release enough information for 
protecting their knowledge property. The technology transition will be very hard with 
this method under the weak IPR protection.  
 
3.5 The technology transition in China 
                                                          
33. Coe, D. T., Helpman, E. and Hoffmaister, A. W. (1997), North-south R&D spillovers, The 
Economic Journal, 107 (440), 134-149. 
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In the early years, international cooperation did not transit much valued technology to 
China. The advanced technology within FDI, import goods are protected by other ways 
not by IPR form, since the IPR system was not good enough for protecting the legal 
right.  The quality of FDI, or import goods are limited by the under-protection IPRs. 
Most of the FDI only produce some low-tech product. The core technology 
productions were made in other regions. The low quality FDI decreased the effect of 
technology transition in China. Within the weak IPRs in China in the early years, for 
imitators, patent system like a library of technological information that allowed them to 
undertake a complete reconstruction of the technology. This situation force inventors 
try to protect their technology by keeping it privately, instead of publishing the 
technology information with patent system. If the FDI or import products have any 
advanced technology, investors would hind the technology information to protect the 
profit brings by the technology. With these protection methods, it is hard for others to 
access the advanced technology information. The international cooperation made little 
contribution on learning and accumulating knowledge in that period, since the 
technology cannot be easily accessed.  
 
With the stronger IPR protection in recent years, more efficient technology transition 
appears in China. I use the foreign patent application as the indicator to reflect the trace 
of the technology transition. As we can see from Graph 3-7, the figure of foreign patent 
in China, there are two turning points with increasing growth rate of patent application. 
One is 1992, when China introduced a stronger patent law. Another is 2000, when 
China became the member of WTO and was enforced to following TRIPS requirement 
taking minimum IPR standards in China. The foreign patent application has a more 
rapid increase after 2000. The promises given by China convince investors from 
abroad that their knowledge asset can be protected by the IPRs. With legal method to 
protect knowledge, the management is easy and low cost. The IPR laws also lower cost 
for others to access the technology information.   
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 Graph 3-7, foreign patent application in China, 1985-2008 
 
Source: Annual Report, Various years, state intellectual property office of the 
people‟s republic of China 
 
Through the international cooperation activities, the advanced knowledge is transited 
from abroad. In China, there is half of the invention application which is the most 
knowledge intensive innovation come from abroad. We can found this information 
from Graph 3-8. Chinese innovation ability is not as powerful as in developed 
countries. Through technology transition, we can learn more advanced technology, and 
improve our technology with the knowledge accumulation.  
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Graph 3-8, domestic invention and foreign invention patent application in China, 1985-
2005  
 
Source: Annual Report, Various years, state intellectual property office of the people‟s 
republic of China 
 
4. Assess the Role of IPR on Economic Growth in China 
 
Maskus applies the method from Coe, Helpman, and Hoffmaister (1997), and finds that 
the stronger patents required by TRIPS could raise Chinese TFP by perhaps 0.6 
percentage points per year
34
. With the stronger IPR protection, more investment was 
spent on R&D activities, and more technologies were transited to China. Both of them 
can increase the rate of innovation. In the long-run these innovation will bring high 
growth on economic in China. In this sector, I try to test the hypothesis that a 
strengthen IPR is associated with a positive effect on GDP. 
 
                                                          
34.  Maskus, K. E. (2000), Intellectual Property Rights and Economic Development, prepared 
for the Series “Beyond the Treaties: A Symposium on Compliance with International 
Intellectual Property Law” 
 30 
 
4.1 Methods 
 
In order to assess the role of IPR on the economic growth in China, the correlation 
study will be developed based on the econometric method. A relation between the 
economic variables, say Yt= a+ b*Xt + ut, often produces empirical results in which the 
R
2
 is quite high, but the Durbin-Watson statistic is quite low. This happens because 
economic time series are dominated by smooth, long term trends. The economic time 
serious‟ variables behave individually are most nonstationary random 
walks. Considering this, I use cointegration theory to analyze the correlation. 
Cointegration is the link between integrated processes and steady state equilibrium. 
The study based on both primary and secondary data to conduct the analysis. I assume 
there is no relation between IPR protection and economic growth, and use econometric 
method to test the hypothesis.   
To detect cointegration I use the following procedure. 
1. Determine whether or not GDPt and IPRt contain unit roots. If the two series are 
both I(d), then we can reject the hypothesis of no relationship between them. This 
is equivalent to say there will be a relationship between GDP and IPR protection 
in long run, they can be cointegrated.   
 
In this study, I use the Augmented Dicky Fuller (ADF) test in Eviews 5.1, to check 
the stationary of time series and detect the existence of unit roots.   
 
2. If they are both I(d), we can estimate the parameters of the cointegrating relation 
with Engle-Granger Technique. At first, I estimate the long-run equilibrium as 
following one. In order to diminish the autocorrelation within variables, I add the 
lag length of GDP in the general model. Using the traditional ordinary least square 
regression method, the final equilibrium can be gain.  
 
LNGDPt = a  +  b* LNIPRt + c* LNGDP(t-1) + d* LNGDP(t-2) + e* LNGDP(t-
3)+ f* LNGDP(t-4)+ g* LNGDP(t-5) 
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3. Test to see whether or not error correction mechanism (Ecmt) in the least squares 
appears to be stationary at beginning (Ecmt~ I(0)). 
 
Ecmt = Yt – Yt-1  
= LNGDPt - LNGDPt-1  
 
In a model which includes two such variables, if it is possible to choose 
coefficients which make error correction mechanism (Ecmt= Yt – Yt-1) in the least 
squares appears to be stationary (Ecmt~ I(0)), we can say that GDP and IPR are 
cointegrated. There is a stable long-run relationship between GDP and IPR 
protection. 
 
4. But such an empirical result does not tell us about the short run relationship 
between GDPt and IPRt. I use the error correction mechanism, Ecmt, to tie the 
short-run behavior of GDP to its long-run value.  The model for short run is, 
 
DLNGDPt=α *DLNIPRt+ β * DLNGDPt-1 + γ * ecmt-1+ εt 
 
where „D‟ denotes the first difference operator.  
 
5. Finally, using Vector Autoregression (VAR) model to do Granger causality test, 
for finding out whether changes of IPR is the course for changes of GDP.  
 
4.2 The Data used 
 
The data used in this study content both primary and secondary data. The authority 
records of the economic data in China‟s Statistical Yearbook published by the China‟s 
Statistical Bureau are very useful. In this study, the GDP figure is used as economic 
indicator. All the GDP data come from the administration record. The index of IPR 
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protection computes here with the method developed by Park Walter G and Ginarte 
Juan Carlos, and based on the fact in China. The Ginarte-Park Index assess the IPR 
level, makes the analysis possible. However, Ginarte-Park Index also has some 
limitation though it is the most popular index to assess the IPR protection. It only 
focuses on the legislation in one country, without calculating on enforcement. In China, 
the enforcement is not as good as the law written on the paper. And the improving of 
enforcement cannot be indicated by the index. In the future study, the result could be 
more reliable, if a better index about the IPR protection could be developed. 
 
Table 4-1: the IPR protection (Ginarte-Park index) in China, 1985-2004 
YEAR Ginarte-Park Index YEAR Ginarte-Park Index 
1985 1.512 1995 3.190 
1986 1.512 1996 3.190 
1987 1.512 1997 3.190 
1988 1.512 1998 3.190 
1989 1.512 1999 3.524 
1990 1.512 2000 3.524 
1991 1.512 2001 4.190 
1992 1.512 2002 4.190 
1993 2.857 2003 4.190 
1994 3.190 2004 4.190 
Note: the content of calculating can be found in the Appendix 3. 
 
Park Walter G and Ginarte Juan Carlos (1997) calculated the IPR protection index in 
110 countries for the period 1960-1990
35
. The index consists of five categories of the 
patent laws
36
: (1) extent of coverage, (2) membership in international patent 
agreements, (3) provisions for loss of protection, (4) enforcement mechanisms, and (5) 
                                                          
35. Park, W. G. and Ginarte, J. C. (1997), Intellectual Property Rights and Economic Growth, 
Journal of Research Policy, Volume 26, 283-301. 
36. The content of these categories have been indicated in the Appendix 1. 
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duration of protection. Each of these categories was scored a value ranging from 0 to 1. 
The sum of these five values gives the overall value of the IPR protection in a country. 
The value between zero to five, the higher number reflect stronger levels of IPR 
protection. Before analysis the relation between the IPR and economic growth in China, 
I calculated the Ginarte-Park Index during the period of 1985-2004
37
 with the 
evaluation method developed by Ginarte and Park and the fact of China. The final 
results have been indicated in Table 4-1.  
 
The figure of GDP and GDP growth rates come from China‟s yearbook, published by 
National Bureau of Statistics of China. For the GDP was calculated by the current price, 
and the GDP growth rate was calculated by the comparable price, the real GDP here is 
calculated with the GDP growth rate and the figure of 1984 (GDP: 720.81 Billian 
Yuan). 
 
Table 4-2: Economic Growth in China, 1985-2004 
year GDP(0.1 Billian Yuan) GDP growth rate Real GDP(0.1 Billian Yuan) LN Real GDP 
1985 9016 13.50% 8181.194 9.009593 
1986 10275.2 8.90% 8909.32 9.094853 
1987 12058.6 11.60% 9942.801 9.204604 
1988 15042.8 11.30% 11066.34 9.311663 
1989 16992.3 4.10% 11520.06 9.351845 
1990 18667.8 3.80% 11957.82 9.389141 
1991 21781.5 9.20% 13057.94 9.477152 
1992 26923.5 14.20% 14912.17 9.609933 
1993 35333.9 14.00% 16999.87 9.740961 
1994 48197.9 13.10% 19226.85 9.864063 
1995 60793.7 10.90% 21322.58 9.967522 
1996 71176.6 10.00% 23454.84 10.06283 
1997 78973 9.30% 25636.14 10.15176 
1998 84402.3 7.80% 27635.76 10.22687 
1999 89677.1 7.60% 29736.07 10.30012 
2000 99214.6 8.40% 32233.9 10.38077 
2001 109655.2 8.30% 34909.32 10.46051 
2002 120332.7 9.10% 38086.06 10.5476 
2003 135822.8 10.00% 41894.67 10.64291 
                                                          
37. The content of the calculating have been indicated in the Appendix 3. 
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2004 159878.3 10.10% 46126.03 10.73913 
Source: Real GDP calculated based on the GDP in 1984 (720.81 Billian Yuan) and GDP growth 
rate which came from China’s Statistical Yearbook, Various years, National Bureau of 
Statistics, China Statistics Press. 
 
4.3 Results 
 
From the data for the period 1985 to 2004 for China, the following results were 
obtained with the traditional ordinary least square regression method. 
  
Ln (GDPt) = 8.789   +   1.182*Ln (IPRt ) 
           t =（89.828）（12.252）  
         R
2
=0.89                D.W.= 0.87 
 
The positive coefficient of independent variable is Ln (IPRt ) which is highly 
significant in statistical. And the R-squared in this model is also very high, 89 percent 
of GDP growth depending on variation of IPR which is an independent factor. 
However, the extremely low Durbin–Watson d value, which suggests the 
autocorrelation between variables, is only 0.87, suggested there is something wrong in 
the preceding regression. Therefore, the result above is meaningless with the 
autocorrelation within variables. In order to against the spurious regression, the model 
will be estimated by a correction of the nonstationary of the series.  
 
I assume that there exists some long-run equilibrium (cointegration) relationship 
among the nonstationary variables. The first step is to use the Augmented Dicky Fuller 
(ADF) test for checking the stationary of time series and detect the existence of unit 
roots in the series. From the result of the test, indicated in the Table 4-3, we can easily 
found that where LNGDPt is nonstationary, its first difference (DLNGDPt) is 
stationary. Regarding the independent variable LNIPRt, the stationary test found it 
integrated as the same order as LNGDPt, its first difference (DLNIPRt) is stationary 
while the LNIPRt is nonstationary.  
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Table 4-3, result of the unit root test of GDP and IPR index,  
Note: Augmented Dicky Fuller (ADF) test, C as intercept; T as trend; K as Lag Length, 
which is automatically selected based on SIC. 
 
Time series LNGDPt and LNIPRt, both are I (1). Then we can use the Engle-Granger 
Technique for testing cointegration with long-run equilibrium relationship among non-
stationary series. The lag length of GDP is considered within the long-run equilibrium 
to diminish the autocorrelation. After omitting the insignificant variables LNGDP(t-2), 
LNGDP(t-3), LNGDP(t-4), LNGDP(t-5), the final equilibrium has been gotten as 
below.  
 
LNGDPt = 0.559  +  0.067 LNIPRt + 0.946 LNGDP(t-1) 
            t = (1.963)   （1.705）         （29.165）  
                         
With the result of t-statistics, we know IPR protection has significant positive effect on 
GDP in the long run. Then, I check the stationary of error correction mechanism (Ecmt) 
with the ADF test to determine whether the hypothesis of no cointegration can be 
rejected.  
 
Ecmt = LNGDPt – (0.559  +  0.067 LNIPRt + 0.946 LNGDP(t-1))  
 
With Eviews 5.1, the result of ADF test for the error correction mechanism has been 
shown in the Table 4-4.  
 
Table 4-4, result for unit root test of error correction mechanism (Ecmt) 
 
 (C,T,K) t-Statistic Test critical values 
(5% level) 
stationary 
LNGDPt (C,T,2) 0.195797 -3.052169 Nonstationary 
DLNGDPt (C,T,1) -4.033097 -3.052169 stationary 
LNIPRt (C,T,0) -2.094668 -3.673616 Nonstationary 
DLNIPRt (C,T,0) -3.747886 -3.690814 stationary 
 (C,T,K) t-Statistic 
Test critical values 
(1% level) 
stationary 
Ecmt (C, T, 1) -4.083312 -3.886751 stationary 
 36 
 
Note: Augmented Dicky Fuller (ADF) test, C as intercept; T as trend; K as Lag Length, 
which is automatically selected based on SIC. 
 
The stationary error correction mechanism indicates that GDP and IPR are cointegrated. 
There is a stable long-run relationship between GDP and IPR protection. The positive 
significant coefficient of LNIPRt is 0.067, which interprets in the long-run every 
percent improvement of the IPR protection will make the GDP grow 6.7 percentage.  
 
Considering there may be disequilibrium in short-run, I use the error correction 
mechanism, Ecmt, to tie the short-run behavior of GDP to its long-run value. The result 
of equilibrium adjustment is,  
 
DLNGDPt=0.05273*DLNIPRt+ 0.9636* DLNGDPt-1 -0.594382* ecmt-1 
           t = (1.150720)                  （14.71938）                      （-2.039312）  
 
where „D‟ denotes the first difference operator, „ecmt-1‟ denotes the one-period lagged 
value of the error from the cointegrating regression. It shows that, short-run changes in 
IPR protection have a significant positive impact on short-run changes in GDP. The 
coefficient 0.05273 is the short-run marginal propensity to economic (GDP) growth. 
The negative coefficient of ecmt-1 adjusts the disequilibrium.  
 
Now we know the two variables, LNIPRt and LNGDPt are cointegrated and each is 
individually first difference. However, we have no idea either IPR must Granger-cause 
GDP or GDP must Granger-cause IPR until now. I use Vector Autoregression (VAR) 
model to do Granger causality test. With Eviews 5.1, I got the result of Granger 
causality test which has been shown in Table 4-5. 
 
Table 4-5, the result of Granger causality test  
Dependent variable: GDP  
Excluded Chi-sq df Prob. 
IPR  10.43750 4  0.0337 
All  10.43750 4  0.0337 
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Dependent variable: IPR  
Excluded Chi-sq df Prob. 
GDP  15.24603 4  0.0042 
All  15.24603 4  0.0042 
 
 
With these results, which explain current GDP in terms of lagged 1 period, 2 periods, 3 
periods, 4 periods IPR protection and current IPR protection in terms of lagged 1 
period, 2 periods, 3 periods, 4 periods GDP, we essentially treat GDP and IPR 
protection as a pair of endogenous variables. There are no exogenous variables in this 
system. Stronger IPR protection could contribute on the GDP growth, at the same time 
government will not strengthen the IPR protection until their economic become better.   
 
4.4 Discussion 
 
China increase IPR protection in recent years based on the need to improve innovation 
ability for sustainable economic growth and the requirement of TRIPS agreement. As I 
have mentioned in section 3, increasing IPR protection will stimulate investment on 
innovation activities and promote widespread dissemination of new knowledge. These 
functions can create a lot of contribution on improving innovation ability. Based on the 
endogenous growth theory, more innovations will encourage on economic growth.  
With this study, we can find the valid positive relation between changes of IPRs and 
changes of GDP in China.  
 
Since 1980, China has made extensive process in joining international IPR convention. 
In this process, the improving IPR system enhance innovation ability in China with 
higher investment in innovation activities and more technology transition both 
interregional and international and create more domestic innovations. As the debate on 
the function of IPR protection has mentioned nowadays, tight IPR protection also cost 
a lot, especially for developing countries.  
 
Looking at the development in different countries, we can easily found several 
examples about the positive impact of strong IPR protection on economic development, 
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for instance, America, Japan. However, the IPRs also bring some blocks on the 
development road. Sometimes because the high cost of using the existing knowledge, 
the innovation would be damaged, and the knowledge spillover became low efficient. 
Considering the weak innovation ability in China, strength IPR protection will reduce 
imitation and increase social cost at the same time.  
 
The IPR protection in China in the early years was very weak. „Western firms are 
always complaining about the theft of intellectual property in China. From knock-off 
designs to copycat brand names, pirated music and fake drugs, China has a well-earned 
reputation as a free-for-all when it comes to patents and copyrights‟38. Most of the 
protection built on the imitated activities in China. Limited literature accumulation and 
physical capital make the innovation ability in China is very weak. Imitation is 
widespread and it has played a major role in the growth of high performing economies 
in the early years such as the development of Japan. Increasing IPR protection will 
increase the imitated cost and transmit the profit from the imitators to the innovators 
which will make a negative effect on economic growth. The final effect of strength IPR 
protection on economic growth depends on whether the cost can be overwhelmed by 
the benefit.  
 
The cost for strengthen IPR protection includes: 
 
1. There will be more cost for using the previous innovation. With the IPR 
protection, others have to pay technology holders fee for legally using patented 
technology. At the national level, the weak IPR protection could help the 
domestic manufactories adopt the advanced technologies which have been 
developed in the foreign market with low cost imitation. There are several 
countries developed their domestic technology with the low cost imitation at 
the begin stage of development. For instance, in the post-war period, the patent 
right could not be granted to pharmaceuticals in Japan. Japanese developed 
                                                          
38 . Economist (April 10
th
, 2008), Chinese firms warm to intellectual property, 
http://www.economist.com/business/displaystory.cfm?story_id=11023270#activate. 
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their technology in pharmaceuticals industry with imitation in those years a lot. 
In addition to this, the IP law encouraged Japanese to apply the utility model 
patent right based on the improvement of the foreign innovation. These weak 
IPR protection treatments in Japan in that period help them to develop their 
own innovation based on the advanced technology transmitted from abroad.  
 
When the IPR protection was increased, others who use technology have to pay 
patent holders fee. The production cost will raise much with the strengthen IPR 
protection. China is a net import technology country, increasing IPR protection 
will shift the profit from domestic to abroad.  
 
Strength protection would also have negative effects on the innovation actions 
at the same time. The strong protection could make sure all the social value 
been obtained by the first generation innovators. For the later generations, 
however, it would be easily infringing the early ones if the protection is much 
wide. By paying, knowledge can be used by later generations. The high cost for 
using knowledge will make innovation activities not easy to gain enough profit 
from the market. The next generation will difficult to be encouraged with the 
strong IPR protection. With the high rate of profit, first generations have less 
willing to do more innovation. They will prefer to enjoy the exiting monopoly 
profit with the IPR protection. 
  
2. Strength IPR protection cost customers more. For all participants in the market 
pursue max profit, Intellectual property holders would like to fix a high price to 
gain more monopoly profit, without worrying the competition from others. 
With strength IPR protection, customers have to shift consumption from low 
price imitation products to legitimate ones. For the legitimate goods always 
have a higher price than imitated goods, customers have to pay more on the 
consumption. Watal (1996) computed that static price impacts of patent 
coverage in India could raise average patentable drug prices by perhaps 50% 
from a 1994 base.   
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3. Cost for IPR management is another negative effect of strength IPR protection. 
Beside the payment to patent holders, IPR management also increases social 
cost a lot with strength IPR protection. Building the organization and training 
stuff to enforce the law, government need to invest some capital and human 
resource on IPR protection. In Chile, additional fixed costs from this upgrade 
were estimated at $718,000 and annual recurrent costs at $837,000 on 
administration
39
. Training professional administrators and judges, promoting 
the law to public all increase the social cost. 
 
The effect of IPR system on economic growth depends on whether social benefits 
which are created by it can cover the social cost. No doubt, the IPR system creates 
social cost with monopoly and complex legal system. In the long-run, these costs may 
be counterbalanced by greater incentives for innovation as discussed earlier. Higher 
productivity and product quality created by the innovation will benefit the economic 
growth. The data analysis in this study has clearly tell us the positive impact of 
strengthen IPR protection on economic growth in China.  
 
5. Conclusion 
The aim of this thesis is to assess the effect of IPR protection on the economic growth 
in China. This has been done by analyzing the role of IPR system on innovation and 
assessing the relation between IPR and GDP in China with time serious data and 
cointegration theory.  
 
Today, there is a heated debate on whether strengthen IPR can benefit the economic 
growth. With different characters in various countries, the IPR system has different 
effects. In this study, I discuss the role of IPR protection on innovation at first, based 
                                                          
39. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 1996, The TRIPS Agreement and 
Developing Countries, (Geneva: UNCTAD). 
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on the previous research. Through endogenous growth theory, we know innovation has 
positive effects on economic growth. Considering this theory and the effects of IPR 
system on innovation, I study the relation between IPR protection and economic 
growth in China.  
 
This study finds strengthen IPR protection can create more innovation through 
encouraging investment on innovation activities and stimulating technology transition 
and dissemination. The IPR protect the knowledge capital, which is the typically non-
rival production. With the weak protection from the law, it will be difficult to get the 
rewards for covering the cost during the innovation process, when the innovators face 
the competition from others‟ free imitation. The IPR system is built to encourage 
investing on innovation activities through giving the innovators monopoly benefit with 
their innovation work. Strong IPR protection makes sure the innovators can be 
benefited with the monopoly profit and then incents innovation activities. In China, 
more investment has been put into R&D activities with increasing IPR protection.  
 
In addition to this, more technology will be transited and disseminated with the 
strength IPR protection both at interregional and international level. Publish patent 
technology information is one part of the requirements for getting patent right. These 
rules lower the access cost to technology information for public. The international 
cooperation which is attracted more by strengthen IPR protection, will also transit 
more advanced information from abroad. China benefits the technology accumulation 
with FDI, international trade and license. If we adopt the foreign patent application as 
the indicator for technology transition, we can found with the IPR protection become 
stronger, more technology was translated to China. More investment on innovation 
activities and technology information dissemination created more innovation in China.  
 
On one hand, strength IPR protection incents more innovation. These activities higher 
the product‟s quality and increase the productivity. On the other hand, imitators have to 
stop their free imitation activities, consumers have to face higher monopoly price, 
government need to spend more resources on administration. The strength IPR 
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protection brings more social cost. Whether strengthen IPR protection can make a 
positive effect on economic growth depends on which part is higher. If the benefit of 
more innovation can overtake the social cost, strengthen IPR protection will make 
positive contribution on economic growth.  
 
For China, we enjoy both the benefits and limitation of strength IPRs. With the limited 
evidence available, 20 years time series data of economic growth and IPR protection in 
China, the result of correlation study based on correlation theory suggests that the 
relationship between IPR and economic growth is significantly positive in the long-run. 
In the short-term, the relation between the two variables is also a valid positive relation. 
Strength IPR protection in China has a significant positive effect on economic growth. 
In brief, increasing IPR protection could be effective, for the benefit can overcome of 
potential limitations that exist in markets for costs and anticompetitive abuse. The 
result also tells us, the IPR protection will be strengthened with wealthier income. 
Higher GDP will strengthen IPR protection.   
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Appendix1: the categories of the GP index 
 yes no 
1. Coverage 
1.1 patentability of pharmaceuticals  1 0 
1.2 Patentability of chemicals 1 0 
1.3 Patentability of food  1 0 
1.4 Patentability of plant and animal varieties 1 0 
1.5 Patentability of surgical products 1 0 
1.6 Patentability of microorganisms 1 0 
1.7 Patentability of utility models 1 0 
2.  Membership in international treaties  
2.1 Paris convention and revisions 1 0 
2.2 Patent cooperation treaty 1 0 
2.3 Protection of new varieties (UPOV) 1 0 
3. Loss of protection measures against losses  
3.1 Working requirements  1 0 
3.2 Compulsory licensing  1 0 
3.3 Revocation of patents 1 0 
4. Enforcement 
4.1 Preliminary injunctions 1 0 
4.2 Contributory infringement  1 0 
4.3 Burden-of-proof reversal 1 0 
5. Duration 
Application-based standard  
x>20 years 1 
0<x<20 x/20 
Grant-based standard  
x>17 years 1 
0<x<17 x/17 
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Appendix2: Volume of International Trade in China 1989-
2005 (0.1 Billion Yuan) 
 
International trade GDP International trade / GDP 
1989 4156.0 16992.3 24.46% 
1990 5560.1 18667.8 29.78% 
1991 7225.8 21781.5 33.17% 
1992 9119.6 26923.5 33.87% 
1993 11271.0 35333.9 31.90% 
1994 20381.9 48197.9 42.29% 
1995 23499.9 60793.7 38.66% 
1996 24133.8 71176.6 33.91% 
1997 26967.2 78973 34.15% 
1998 26849.7 84402.3 31.81% 
1999 29896.2 89677.1 33.34% 
2000 39273.2 99214.6 39.58% 
2001 42183.6 109655.2 38.47% 
2002 51378.2 120332.7 42.70% 
2003 70483.5 135822.8 51.89% 
2004 95539.1 159878.3 59.76% 
2005 116921.8 183084.8 63.86% 
Source: 1985-2005 from China‟s Statistical Yearbook, Various years, National Bureau of Statistics, China Statistics Press 
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Appendix3: the GP index of China, 1985-2004 
          
Year 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7 
Sub- 
total  2.1 2.2 2.3 
Sub- 
total  3.1 3.2 3.3 
Sub- 
total  4.1 4.2 4.3 
Sub- 
total  5 total 
1985 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0.429 1 0 0 0.333 0 0 0 0.000 0 0 0 0.000 0.75 1.512 
1986 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0.429 1 0 0 0.333 0 0 0 0.000 0 0 0 0.000 0.75 1.512 
1987 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0.429 1 0 0 0.333 0 0 0 0.000 0 0 0 0.000 0.75 1.512 
1988 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0.429 1 0 0 0.333 0 0 0 0.000 0 0 0 0.000 0.75 1.512 
1989 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0.429 1 0 0 0.333 0 0 0 0.000 0 0 0 0.000 0.75 1.512 
1990 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0.429 1 0 0 0.333 0 0 0 0.000 0 0 0 0.000 0.75 1.512 
1991 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0.429 1 0 0 0.333 0 0 0 0.000 0 0 0 0.000 0.75 1.512 
1992 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0.429 1 0 0 0.333 0 0 0 0.000 0 0 0 0.000 0.75 1.512 
1993 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0.857 1 0 0 0.333 0 1 0 0.333 0 1 0 0.333 1 2.857 
1994 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0.857 1 1 0 0.667 0 1 0 0.333 0 1 0 0.333 1 3.190 
1995 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0.857 1 1 0 0.667 0 1 0 0.333 0 1 0 0.333 1 3.190 
1996 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0.857 1 1 0 0.667 0 1 0 0.333 0 1 0 0.333 1 3.190 
1997 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0.857 1 1 0 0.667 0 1 0 0.333 0 1 0 0.333 1 3.190 
1998 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0.857 1 1 0 0.667 0 1 0 0.333 0 1 0 0.333 1 3.190 
1999 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0.857 1 1 0 0.667 0 1 0 0.333 0 1 0 0.333 1 3.190 
2000 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0.857 1 1 0 0.667 0 1 0 0.333 0 1 0 0.333 1 3.190 
2001 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0.857 1 1 1 1.000 0 1 0 0.333 1 1 1 1.000 1 4.190 
2002 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0.857 1 1 1 1.000 0 1 0 0.333 1 1 1 1.000 1 4.190 
2003 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0.857 1 1 1 1.000 0 1 0 0.333 1 1 1 1.000 1 4.190 
2004 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0.857 1 1 1 1.000 0 1 0 0.333 1 1 1 1.000 1 4.190 
Source: Based on the Patent Laws & Regulations and the fact in China from 1985-2004 
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Appendix 4: Patent application in China, 1985-2005 
  
Domestic 
  
Foreign 
Total Invention 
Utility 
Model Design Total Invention 
Utility 
Model Design 
1985 9411 4065 5077 269   4961 4493 97 371 
1986 13680 3494 9580 606   4829 4515 93 221 
1987 21663 3975 16605 1083   4414 4084 101 229 
1988 28582 4780 22190 1612   5429 4872 210 347 
1989 27367 4749 20553 2065   5538 4910 174 454 
1990 36585 5832 27488 3265   4884 4305 127 452 
1991 45395 7372 33157 4866   4645 4051 125 469 
1992 61788 10022 44198 7568   5347 4387 171 789 
1993 68153 12084 47252 8817   9123 7534 247 1342 
1994 67807 11191 45188 11428   9928 7876 323 1729 
1995 68880 10018 43429 15433   14165 11618 312 2235 
1996 82207 11471 49341 21395   20528 17046 263 3219 
1997 90076 12710 49904 27462   24132 20953 225 2954 
1998 96248 13726 51226 31296   25741 22234 171 3336 
1999 109970 15598 57215 37157   24269 21096 277 2896 
2000 140339 25346 68461 46532   30343 26401 354 3588 
2001 165773 30038 79275 56460   37800 33166 447 4187 
2002 205544 39806 92166 73572   47087 40426 973 5688 
2003 251238 56769 107842 86627   57249 48549 1273 7427 
2004 278943 65786 111578 101579   74864 64347 1247 9270 
2005 383157 93485 138085 151587   93107 79842 1481 11784 
Source: 1985-2005 from annual reports of State Intellectual Property Office of China 
